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January 2011 Business Valuation Issues in Bankruptcy
With the increased volume of
bankruptcy filings and corporate distress that have accompanied the recent
economic downturn, valuation specialists have been engaged to provide opinions
of value that are a critical component of any meaningful assessment of value at
different points in the bankruptcy process.
Bankruptcy courts determine the applicable definition of value on a case-by-case
basis and in light of each valuation’s purpose and the underlying circumstances.
Therefore, different definitions of value may be required for different
purposes, and the definition of value applicable to a certain purpose may not be
binding with respect to other purposes. This article discusses two important
valuation issues in the bankruptcy setting: (a) solvency tests
and (b) standards of value and
alternative premises of value (below).
Solvency Tests A 2010 case,
In re Premier Entertainment Biloxi LLC, illustrates how the application of different
solvency tests could result in a material difference in the final outcome. Just two weeks after its grand opening, the Hard Rock Hotel and Casino in
Biloxi, Mississippi, was nearly destroyed by Hurricane Katrina. The owners
eventually recovered $181 million from their insurers, but the casino’s first
lien note holders disputed the owners’ rights to the funds. The casino
ultimately filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy because the owners could not access
the funds to finish the reconstruction. Almost immediately after filing, the debtors proposed to pay the notes at par
value plus interest, thereby extinguishing the note holders’ liens and releasing
the insurance proceeds. The bankruptcy court confirmed the plan and released the
funds, despite objections from the note holders, who claimed they were still
owed $10.75 million in prepayment penalties pursuant to the original security
agreement and the Bankruptcy Code. In particular, the note holders argued, Sec. 502(b) of the Bankruptcy Code
permits unsecured creditors to recoup damages from a solvent debtor, and the
debtors were solvent at all times because, simply put, “their debts never
exceeded their assets.” The debtors had access to more than $40 million in
financing from a secondary source, which had already invested over $150 million
in rebuilding the resort. By contrast, the debtors insisted they were “equitably” insolvent as of the
bankruptcy petition, because without access to the insurance proceeds they had
only $200,000 in cash and over $230 million in outstanding liabilities. More
important, they were in danger of losing their Hard Rock license and any
opportunity to successfully rebuild. After reviewing a “wealth of evidence" from both parties, the court ultimately
said the issue turned on which solvency test applied: (a) the adjusted
balance sheet test, as proposed by the note holders, or (b) the debtors’
“equitable insolvency” test, derived largely from statutory case law
concerning fraudulent transfers. To support the
former, the note holders’ solvency expert testified that the debtors had nearly
$253 million in assets and only $230 million in liabilities per their bankruptcy
schedules. He made two adjustments:
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increased the
Hard Rock license from its $472,000 book value on the schedules to over
$11.8 million, the value on the debtors’ application for secondary financing
and SEC filing; and
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included $17.5
million for construction in progress, which the debtors also reported to
their lenders but omitted from their cost-basis bankruptcy balance sheets.
After these adjustments, the debtors’ assets exceeded liabilities by roughly $50
million at the time of filing. Even on a cost-basis approach, assets exceeded
liabilities by over $28 million. The debtors did not present their own expert but maintained they had limited
usable cash at the time of filing and owed hundreds of millions, including $160
million to the note holders. Several trade vendors had filed lawsuits and liens,
and the owners contended that three or more could have filed an involuntary
bankruptcy petition, thereby meeting the equitable insolvency test. Unfortunately for the debtor, the court ruled that their test applied to limited
factual circumstances. In this case, the adjusted balance sheet was “the
traditional bankruptcy test of insolvency.” The adjustments by the note holders’
expert were appropriate — in particular, his use of the market value of the Hard
Rock license, as corroborated by its assigned value in the debtors public
filings and loan documentation. Accordingly, the court found the debtors were
solvent at all relevant times and awarded the note holders their unsecured
claims for $10.5 million liquidated damages.
Standards of
Value, Premises of Value In a bankruptcy proceeding, valuation specialists may be utilized prior to the
bankruptcy filing, during the pendency of the bankruptcy proceeding and when the
entity emerges from bankruptcy. The standard-of-value terminology applicable to valuations in bankruptcy may
differ from the terminology in traditional valuation circumstances, and it is
often the case that value is not clearly defined in the Bankruptcy Code or
applicable state statutes. Moreover, the premise-of-value decision in certain
bankruptcy matters is not straightforward and may require consideration of court
precedent, characteristics specific to the subject company, and the
circumstances related to and the intended use of the valuation. In these cases, the choice of the applicable premise of value may have the
single largest impact on valuation results and, therefore, the outcome of the
matter. Addressed in further detail below are the different standards and
premises of value that merit consideration in bankruptcy matters. Traditional business enterprise and asset valuations are typically performed
under one of three basic standards of value: (a) fair market value, (b) investment value, or
(c) fair value. However, the valuation terminology that applies in bankruptcy matters may differ
from traditional valuation and, as stated above, is most often not clearly
defined in the Bankruptcy Code or applicable state statutes.
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Standards of Value Often
Encountered in Bankruptcy Matters
Source: AICPA Consulting Services
Practice Aid 02-1, Business Valuation in Bankruptcy (New York: AICPA, 2002), p.
5.02. |
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Bankruptcy Code and Case Law: |
Fair Value (often interpreted as
Fair Market Value in Case Law) Reasonably Equivalent Value Present Fair Salable Value |
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State Fraudulent Transfer Act: |
Fair Valuation |
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State Fraudulent Conveyance Act: |
Present Fair Salable Value |
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The selected premise of value should reflect the facts and circumstances
underlying each valuation engagement. In the bankruptcy context, all valuations
are performed under a "going concern" premise of value or a liquidation
premise of value. Assets are typically valued under the going-concern premise of
value, unless a debtor was on its deathbed at the time or liquidation in
bankruptcy was clearly imminent, in which case a liquidation premise of
value may be applicable. Under the liquidation premise of value, either an
orderly disposition or forced liquidation premise is utilized.
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Alternative Premises of
Value
Source: Shannon P.
Pratt, Robert F. Reilly, Robert P. Schweihs, "Valuing a Business,
The Analysis and Appraisal of Closely Held Companies," Fourth
Edition, McGraw-Hill, 2000, pp. 33 and 34. |
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Going Concern: |
Value in
continued use, as a mass assemblage of income producing
assets, and as a going-concern business enterprise. |
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State Fraudulent Transfer Act: |
Value-in-exchange, on a piecemeal basis (not part of a mass
assemblage of assets), as part of an orderly
disposition; this premise contemplates that all of the
assets of the business enterprise will be sold individually
and that they will enjoy normal exposure to their
appropriate secondary market. |
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State Fraudulent Conveyance Act: |
Value-in-exchange, on a piecemeal basis (not part of a mass
assemblage of assets), as part of a forced
liquidation; this premise contemplates that the assets of
the business enterprise will be sold individually and that
they will experience less than normal exposure to their
appropriate secondary market. |
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